Gurus and Game Changers
Dan Hodges makes a clever case about the scale of the challenge facing Labour's new election strategist, David Axelrod.
"Is the new guru a game changer?", asks Hodges in his Telegraph blog before going on to answer his own question in the negative unless Axelrod can pull of the feat of persuading voters to be totally illogical when they go to the polls in 2015.
Ed Milband’s new guru David Axelrod has to persuade the voters to be totally illogical
By Dan Hodges - The Telegraph
David Axelrod. (Photo: Reuters)
The Axeman cometh. Last week, David Axelrod, Barack Obama’s most influential campaign strategist, was snapped up by the Labour Party. Think Ed Miliband is weird? Think again. By the time Axelrod has worked his magic you’ll be telling yourself the geeky Marxist philosopher’s son is the David Beckham of British politics. Or at least that he’s not the David Brent of British politics.
The news of Axelrod’s arrival has sent Labour into a frenzy of excitement. Indeed, the Labour press office got a little overexcited, misspelling his name “Alexrod” in the press release announcing the move.
It has also seen Miliband’s party relapsing into one of its convenient bouts of amnesia. When Axelrod’s former White House colleague Jim Messina was lured across the Atlantic to work for the Conservatives, Labour’s response was to call it a “celebrity hire”. Miliband already had his own Obama guru, the community organiser Arnie Graf, they explained. Community organising – not big money machine politics – was the future.
But now Labour has ditched all that hippy community organising nonsense, and has gone back to traditional, big gun, political PR. It’s a smart move, and Axelrod represents an astute appointment. He also represents a coup for Labour’s much maligned chief campaign co-ordinator, Douglas Alexander, who had been facing criticism from some within Miliband’s inner circle. They were unhappy about his blunt insistence that Graf be sidelined.
What Axelrod doesn’t represent is the political “game changer” some Labour insiders and commentators have been claiming. Indeed, when he arrives at Labour’s Brewer’s Green HQ for his first meeting tomorrow, he’s quickly going to realise that securing the election of America’s first black president was a cake-walk compared with the challenge of getting Miliband into Downing Street.
Since word of his appointment first aired on Friday, many of the hurdles facing David Axelrod have already been highlighted. Not least of which is the recognition that it’s impossible to run an Obama-style campaign without Barack Obama. In 2008 and 2012, Axelrod was working with a political phenomenon. His campaigns were able to surf the wave of history.
Even Miliband’s most ardent fans would not claim their champion is a political phenomenon. And when it comes to historic tidal waves, the Labour leader is short of a surf-board.
One of the other issues is the differing nature of the British and US political systems, and the resources available to manipulate them. Axelrod has no huge fundraising war chest of the kind that financed his campaigns in the States, or the ability to buy up the vast swathes of television advertising that were such an important part of defining Obama and shaping his message. Similarly, he will not have access to the streams of data that underpinned the US president’s sophisticated “voter outreach” strategy, nor any way of achieving the same degree of micro-targeting that enabled him to deploy Obama’s nationwide army of activists.
But to an extent, these are side issues. The biggest problem facing Axelrod isn’t the scarcity of resources. Or the Miliband problem. Or Labour’s lack of anything resembling a coherent alternative programme for government. (Though each of these is obviously a drawback.)
The biggest problem facing Axelrod is that to win the next election for Ed Miliband he has to convince the British people to act totally and utterly irrationally.
Throughout the Eighties and early Nineties, as election defeat followed election defeat, the internal debate within the Labour Party came to centre around the issue of “self-interest”. Labour’s modernising faction argued that the voters were essentially self-centered, and Labour had to offer them something individually – rather than collectively – to secure their support. The traditionalists argued that this was too cynical and simplistic, that the British people weren’t fundamentally materialistic, and if framed in the right way altruism could still swing the day. In the end the modernisers won out, and Labour finally began to win elections again.
But in fact, both sides’ analysis was wrong. The voters don’t act selfishly or altruistically. They just act logically.
In 1979, the rational thing to do was vote Conservative. Labour had wrecked Britain. The economy was a basket-case. Things couldn’t really get any worse. By 1983 things were still quite bad. But by then Labour was a basket-case. No sane person wanted Michael Foot and his party running the country. So again, to vote Tory was to vote rationally.
In 1987, Labour was finally emerging from the worst of its cabin fever. But by now, Britain was booming. Again, voting to maintain the status quo was the rational choice. In 1992 that choice was more difficult. The economy was in recession, the Tories were hated. But Labour still weren’t trusted, and Neil Kinnock represented a leap in the dark. And for the majority, who were in work, and still just about managing to get by, a leap in the dark was the last thing they felt they could afford. So again logic prevailed.
At which point, we reach 1997. And the proof of the theory. In 1997, the economy was growing again. But the Tories were still hated, and also looked thoroughly burnt-out. Similarly, Labour no longer represented a risk or a threat. Their leader was clearly competent, their agenda self-avowedly moderate. So the voters could dump the party they disliked at no personal cost. And they did, even though the economy was growing. They voted rationally, though not from a position of narrow self-interest.
This is the real nature of the challenge facing Axelrod and Miliband. In 12 months’ time the voters will be presented with a Tory-led Government that is presiding over a steadily recovering economy. That is delivering historically low interest rates. Historically low inflation. Falling unemployment. Wages that are finally outstripping prices.
Against that they will see an Opposition they still blame for the economic mess of five years ago. With a leader who is seen as otherworldly and weak. Who leads a party not trusted on the economy, or any of the other significant policy areas, save perhaps the sacred cow of the NHS.
There is only one logical choice for the British people to make. And David Axelrod has to find a way of convincing them not to make it.
It’s not a totally futile task. Lots of people did vote for Foot in 1983. And for John Major in 1997. You can make a plausible case that the victory Axelrod masterminded in 2008 wasn’t logical in the strictest sense. Facing the worst financial crisis for a generation, America turned to the untried and untested one-term senator from Illinois, not the popular and respected elder statesman and war hero John McCain.
Plus, Labour is already tooled up for a campaign based on raw emotion, not hard logic. Anger, envy, moral outrage – these were long ago selected as Miliband’s watchwords for 2015. But at the end of the day, Labour’s new strategist has to convince the voters to turn their back on logic. And he’s asking that of an electorate that has never done that before.
Many of Miliband’s supporters are hoping Axelrod’s appointment will change the rules of the game. But as Axelrod proved when he masterminded Obama’s historic 2008 and 2012 re-election campaign, in politics there rarely are any game-changers.
The Axeman cometh. Last week, David Axelrod, Barack Obama’s most influential campaign strategist, was snapped up by the Labour Party. Think Ed Miliband is weird? Think again. By the time Axelrod has worked his magic you’ll be telling yourself the geeky Marxist philosopher’s son is the David Beckham of British politics. Or at least that he’s not the David Brent of British politics.
The news of Axelrod’s arrival has sent Labour into a frenzy of excitement. Indeed, the Labour press office got a little overexcited, misspelling his name “Alexrod” in the press release announcing the move.
It has also seen Miliband’s party relapsing into one of its convenient bouts of amnesia. When Axelrod’s former White House colleague Jim Messina was lured across the Atlantic to work for the Conservatives, Labour’s response was to call it a “celebrity hire”. Miliband already had his own Obama guru, the community organiser Arnie Graf, they explained. Community organising – not big money machine politics – was the future.
But now Labour has ditched all that hippy community organising nonsense, and has gone back to traditional, big gun, political PR. It’s a smart move, and Axelrod represents an astute appointment. He also represents a coup for Labour’s much maligned chief campaign co-ordinator, Douglas Alexander, who had been facing criticism from some within Miliband’s inner circle. They were unhappy about his blunt insistence that Graf be sidelined.
What Axelrod doesn’t represent is the political “game changer” some Labour insiders and commentators have been claiming. Indeed, when he arrives at Labour’s Brewer’s Green HQ for his first meeting tomorrow, he’s quickly going to realise that securing the election of America’s first black president was a cake-walk compared with the challenge of getting Miliband into Downing Street.
Since word of his appointment first aired on Friday, many of the hurdles facing David Axelrod have already been highlighted. Not least of which is the recognition that it’s impossible to run an Obama-style campaign without Barack Obama. In 2008 and 2012, Axelrod was working with a political phenomenon. His campaigns were able to surf the wave of history.
Even Miliband’s most ardent fans would not claim their champion is a political phenomenon. And when it comes to historic tidal waves, the Labour leader is short of a surf-board.
One of the other issues is the differing nature of the British and US political systems, and the resources available to manipulate them. Axelrod has no huge fundraising war chest of the kind that financed his campaigns in the States, or the ability to buy up the vast swathes of television advertising that were such an important part of defining Obama and shaping his message. Similarly, he will not have access to the streams of data that underpinned the US president’s sophisticated “voter outreach” strategy, nor any way of achieving the same degree of micro-targeting that enabled him to deploy Obama’s nationwide army of activists.
But to an extent, these are side issues. The biggest problem facing Axelrod isn’t the scarcity of resources. Or the Miliband problem. Or Labour’s lack of anything resembling a coherent alternative programme for government. (Though each of these is obviously a drawback.)
The biggest problem facing Axelrod is that to win the next election for Ed Miliband he has to convince the British people to act totally and utterly irrationally.
Throughout the Eighties and early Nineties, as election defeat followed election defeat, the internal debate within the Labour Party came to centre around the issue of “self-interest”. Labour’s modernising faction argued that the voters were essentially self-centered, and Labour had to offer them something individually – rather than collectively – to secure their support. The traditionalists argued that this was too cynical and simplistic, that the British people weren’t fundamentally materialistic, and if framed in the right way altruism could still swing the day. In the end the modernisers won out, and Labour finally began to win elections again.
But in fact, both sides’ analysis was wrong. The voters don’t act selfishly or altruistically. They just act logically.
In 1979, the rational thing to do was vote Conservative. Labour had wrecked Britain. The economy was a basket-case. Things couldn’t really get any worse. By 1983 things were still quite bad. But by then Labour was a basket-case. No sane person wanted Michael Foot and his party running the country. So again, to vote Tory was to vote rationally.
In 1987, Labour was finally emerging from the worst of its cabin fever. But by now, Britain was booming. Again, voting to maintain the status quo was the rational choice. In 1992 that choice was more difficult. The economy was in recession, the Tories were hated. But Labour still weren’t trusted, and Neil Kinnock represented a leap in the dark. And for the majority, who were in work, and still just about managing to get by, a leap in the dark was the last thing they felt they could afford. So again logic prevailed.
At which point, we reach 1997. And the proof of the theory. In 1997, the economy was growing again. But the Tories were still hated, and also looked thoroughly burnt-out. Similarly, Labour no longer represented a risk or a threat. Their leader was clearly competent, their agenda self-avowedly moderate. So the voters could dump the party they disliked at no personal cost. And they did, even though the economy was growing. They voted rationally, though not from a position of narrow self-interest.
This is the real nature of the challenge facing Axelrod and Miliband. In 12 months’ time the voters will be presented with a Tory-led Government that is presiding over a steadily recovering economy. That is delivering historically low interest rates. Historically low inflation. Falling unemployment. Wages that are finally outstripping prices.
Against that they will see an Opposition they still blame for the economic mess of five years ago. With a leader who is seen as otherworldly and weak. Who leads a party not trusted on the economy, or any of the other significant policy areas, save perhaps the sacred cow of the NHS.
There is only one logical choice for the British people to make. And David Axelrod has to find a way of convincing them not to make it.
It’s not a totally futile task. Lots of people did vote for Foot in 1983. And for John Major in 1997. You can make a plausible case that the victory Axelrod masterminded in 2008 wasn’t logical in the strictest sense. Facing the worst financial crisis for a generation, America turned to the untried and untested one-term senator from Illinois, not the popular and respected elder statesman and war hero John McCain.
Plus, Labour is already tooled up for a campaign based on raw emotion, not hard logic. Anger, envy, moral outrage – these were long ago selected as Miliband’s watchwords for 2015. But at the end of the day, Labour’s new strategist has to convince the voters to turn their back on logic. And he’s asking that of an electorate that has never done that before.
Many of Miliband’s supporters are hoping Axelrod’s appointment will change the rules of the game. But as Axelrod proved when he masterminded Obama’s historic 2008 and 2012 re-election campaign, in politics there rarely are any game-changers.
